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


9 November 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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Afghanistan-Pakistan-USSR Neither Kabul nor Rawalpindi has shown willingness to make significant concessions to facilitate the resumption of Afghan transit traffic across Pakistan. Tension along the border will probably grow as each government steps up its propaganda output and blames the other for the continuing impasse. Afghan leaders, who have refused to make even minor concessions toward a

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[] compromise formula, appear ready to accept risks of even greater dependence on the USSR for economic and military support.

[] Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky, who recently completed an inspection visit in Afghanistan, reportedly has recommended some reorganization of the Afghan military establishment and the introduction of new equipment more suitable to Afghanistan's mountainous terrain. Adoption of his recommendations would entail expanded supervision and training of the Afghan Army by an enlarged Soviet military advisory mission. []

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[] Albania-Bloc: Albanian party boss Enver Hoxha, speaking in Tirana at a 7 November meeting in honor of the 20th anniversary of the founding of his party, made his strongest personal attack on Khrushchev. He accused Khrushchev of "putschist" and "anti-Marxist" attempts to force Tirana to heel, and charged Khrushchev with attempting to incite Greece against Albania. Hoxha also gave details of the economic, political, and military moves by the bloc against Albania. The Albanian leader said that Khrushchev had attacked the Albanian party at the Soviet congress because he had failed to impose his views at the earlier international Communist meetings at Bucharest in June 1960 and at Moscow in November 1960. He also said that Khrushchev's attacks on the Albanian leaders at the 22nd party congress had "effectively sabotaged any future meeting."

*Hoxha's claim that the vast majority of the Soviet delegates did not support the Soviet leadership will be the most infuriating to Moscow of his many charges, and may at least temporarily cause some confusion in Eastern Europe. Hoxha has carried the denunciation of the Soviet leadership to such an extreme that Khrushchev will regard even indirect support of Tirana by Peiping as a clear challenge to his position. []

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Iran: The Shah appears to be preparing to relegate Prime Minister Amini to a subordinate role, if not to remove him. Although the Shah remains the primary focus of power in the country, Amini, unlike earlier prime ministers, has not sought the approval and advice of the Shah at every step. Speaking to the American and British ambassadors, the Shah stressed his intention to sponsor a "new program of reform" to be carried out by a "team"--a cabinet and prime minister--with whom he would work out the details.

[The Shah, who plans to continue to govern without a Parliament, has always proved unable to refrain from personal participation in the government. While he is apparently sincere in wanting certain types of reform, he probably believes that he must promote social and economic improvement in order to get the foreign military and economic aid he desires. In the past, his attempts to put reforms into effect have been largely nullified by his failure to follow through on his decrees and by his apparent refusal to recognize that the class upon which his regime rests opposes reform.]

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*Ecuador: (Information as of 0300 EST) President Arosemena appeared to be in uncontested control of the country's top office by late yesterday after the navy and air force supported him against the opposition of the top military command and army units stationed in Quito. Basic political instability remains, however, and the policies of the new administration will be under constant critical scrutiny by the military as well as by leftist and rightist political factions.

Elements of moderate and rightist political groups had apparently reached some sort of agreement with Arosemena prior to President Velasco's ouster on 7 November, and they apparently believe they can exert a controlling or moderating influence on the new president's policies. Such

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agreement seems to be reflected in the cabinet appointments announced thus far which include a number of moderate Socialists and Conservatives, but no known Communists or radical leftists.

Despite this apparent rapprochement with center and right-wing groups, Arosemena remains heavily obligated to leftist-Communist elements, and will be under heavy pressure from them to bring their representatives into the administration and to proceed immediately with radical economic and social reforms. If Arosemena resists these pressures, he will risk alienating what has been his principal mass support; if he gives in to the leftist pressures, he might well provoke a military-rightist move to oust him.

Arosemena's political dilemma is further complicated by the government's difficult financial position and its limited resources for carrying out even modest development programs.

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

South Vietnam: Communist forces continue their efforts to undermine the Diem government by widespread guerrilla attacks, sabotage, and terrorism in order to expand Viet Cong areas of control in South Vietnam.

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Hoxha Defies Khrushchev in Fiery Speech

Hoxha's speech reveals new details about the Albanian-Soviet dispute, although Tirana is still withholding its promised extensive documentation. Hoxha renewed Albania's defiance of all Soviet moves to bring Albania back into line by stating that the Albanian people and party "will live on grass if necessary" before they will recant or "sell themselves to the imperialists." He added that Albania has friends and comrades in the socialist camp from whom it can accept aid.

Hoxha claimed that the USSR in its attempts to create a "cordon sanitaire" around Albania had cut credits for Albania's current five-year plan, had withdrawn its specialists from Albania despite Tirana's pleas, had cut off the scholarships of Albanian military and civilian students in the USSR, and had demanded--nine years ahead of time--repayment of old credits, thus "almost breaking off" bilateral trade relations on a barter basis.

Hoxha claimed that Khrushchev, aware that Greece has irredentist claims against Albania, told "Greek reaction that socialist Albania is no longer an ally of the Soviet Union." Khrushchev then chastized Tirana for not following a line of "peaceful coexistence" with Greece. Hoxha also voiced his disagreement with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, saying that he was a great leader. Referring to Khrushchev's attack on the "cult of personality," he pointed to the "great efforts being made to present Khrushchev. . . as a 'great military strategist,' . . . the 'architect' of victory against Naziism." At various times in his speech Hoxha referred to Khrushchev as an anti-Marxist, a revisionist, and opportunist, and a horned devil, and described him as inhuman and monstrous.

Hoxha reasserted that Albania favored a speedy solution to the German problem, but that it was "the accusers"--Khrushchev--who were afraid of a solution and who therefore "delayed it from year to year." He said that Albania approves of

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"peaceful coexistence" but does not agree with Khrushchev's "opportunist" view that it should be "the general foreign policy line. . . the main path to victory. . . on a world scale."

Hoxha appealed for support to Communists around the world over the heads of their leaders. He claimed that not all the foreign delegations at the 22nd party congress had supported Khrushchev's attacks, and that those that did--including the East European delegations--could be excused because they had not expected the attacks and were not able to choose their response. Although Hoxha did not specifically refer to current Chinese Communist support, China and North Vietnam are the only bloc states known to have sent official greetings to Albania on the occasion of its 20th anniversary.

Suggesting there were disagreements within the Soviet leadership, Hoxha alleged that only a small number of the Soviet delegates came out against the Albanian party at the party congress. He interpreted this to mean that the vast majority of the Soviet delegates did not support Khrushchev on this issue. Actually the principal Soviet speeches all supported Khrushchev either directly or by implication; remarks by the other delegates did not appear indicative of disagreement. [REDACTED]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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